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May Days 
Over the past few weeks a string of 
elections – in different countries, at 
different levels, with different stakes 
– had a direct impact on the course 
of EU policy development. France 
has changed its President; Greece 
has not found a workable majority to 
run the country; Germany’s biggest 
region has also experienced a clear 
political shift; and, right on the 
outskirts of the Union, Serbia has 
also changed its President and may 
now need extra effort to stay the 
course on its path towards EU 
accession.  
Last but certainly not least, a 
comfortable majority of Irish voters 
– albeit with a low turnout – has 
approved the intergovernmental 
“fiscal pact” treaty signed earlier this 
year, thus joining the other EU 
countries under EFSF assistance 
(who have all ratified it already) and 
dispelling the fears of another 
potential blow to the euro zone. 
The arrival of a new President in 
France has always triggered a partial 
“reset” of EU policy-making. Five 
years ago, the first effect of Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s election was the speedy 
negotiation that led to the Lisbon 
Treaty. Francois Hollande’s victory, in 
turn, may speed up an already tangible 
realignment of priorities prompted by 
the worsening economic and fiscal 
situation in many member states. 
After May, however, comes June. 
Both the French and the Greek voters 
are set to return to the polls for 
another round of elections that will 
have repercussions well beyond their 
countries. Only after that will it be 
possible to try and find a consensual 
collective response to conflicting 
policy demands within the euro zone. 
Because the paradox is that, despite all 
the complaints about the lack of a 
European demos, both votes will be 
primarily about EU policy, which has 
stood firmly at the core of the 
respective campaigns. Could these 
become building blocks for a different 
method of constructing a more 
integrated Europe? 
Spheres and spaces 
This issue of BEPA Monthly Brief is 
in large part devoted to exploring 
what margins may exist for 
recalibrating fiscal consolidation at 
EU level in the current political and 
economic context in order to spur 
short-term growth – for thinking, so 
to speak, “outside the box but inside 
the pact”. 
Any reflection to this end should 
take into account that such trade-
offs and (re)balancing acts as the one 
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in the offing now are not uncommon. In the 
1990s, after the big leap forward represented by 
the Maastricht Treaty, Germany wanted to be 
reassured that there would be life – a stable, 
sound and prosperous one – after the Deutsche 
Mark. This led to the Growth and Stability Pact, 
whose negotiation and approval followed 
Maastrichts’s entry into force yet preceded the 
actual launch of the euro. This time around, after 
Germany has been given treaty-based guarantees 
about the “fiscal compact”, other member states 
want to be reassured that there will be life after 
protracted austerity and recession. 
Such mutual reassurances matter enormously for 
both policy effectiveness and political legitimacy: 
in various combinations, they have been at the 
core of the European construction throughout 
the decades. Yet they are not always easy to agree 
upon – let alone enforce.  
In a book recently translated into French (Le 
passage a l’Europe: histoire d’un commencement: the 
original Dutch edition dates back to 2009) the 
writer and journalist Luuk van Middelaar argues 
that EU policy-making is increasingly conducted 
in a sort of intermediate sphere between the two 
traditional ones of times past, namely the 
“external” sphere (the Europe of 
intergovernmental fights and deals) and the 
“internal” one (the integrated EUrope of 
common institutions). This new sphere – which 
he compares, inspired by French historian 
Jacques Le Goff, to the space that medieval 
culture assigned to the Purgatory – is where the 
current discussions and negotiations over the 
euro zone are taking place, at the intersection 
between different priorities, actors, and 
jurisdictions. His main conclusion is that a 
European res publica is indeed taking shape but it 
is still articulated in a number of national debates 
and deliberations – thus resembling what 
Kalypso Nicolaïdis once called a demoi-cracy. 
Styles and symmetries 
The EU construction has often been portrayed 
through architectural metaphors. Reforms 
deemed insufficient were seen as “façade”, and 
of course the whole building seen in need for 
radical “refounding”. Philippe Schmitter 
famously compared the EU institutional system 
to a “condominium”, and Sergio Fabbrini 
labelled it as a “compound” democracy. Critics 
have long defined the Union as “Baroque” – 
meaning convoluted, opaque, formalistic 
(although 17th century buildings were quite 
different from Bavaria to Sicily, from Poland to 
Portugal) – as opposed to the “Romanesque” 
design (solid, essential) of the Founding Fathers. 
More recently, in an article published in Le Monde 
(18/12/2011), Jacques Keller-Noëllet and the 
same Luuk van Middelaar compared the EU 
system to a Gothic cathedral, and not only for its 
Franco-German roots – one could in fact argue 
that Durham and Burgos are no less typical than 
Chartres, Reims, Strasbourg and Ulm – but also 
for the unique ability of late medieval architects 
to find innovative solutions to intractable 
problems. 
Accordingly, one of these problems was the UK 
opposition to keeping the “fiscal compact” 
inside the main institutional building as just 
another one of the many dedicated chapels 
(EMU, Schengen) already enshrined within the 
Union’s broad walls. The solution found with 
the “fiscal compact” treaty would thus 
correspond to a flying buttress (arc-boutant), 
provided it rests on the main body of the 
cathedral, is made with the same materials and is 
stylistically in line with it. By the same token, one 
could argue that the pressure mounting for a 
“growth pact” – as a side-effect also of the May 
elections – could now be seen as a symmetric 
flying buttress (contrefort) to balance off the fiscal 
treaty and reinforce the whole building. 
Gothic architecture – not unlike the EU – is 
indeed based on symmetry and balance as well as 
on spires, vaults and pinnacles. Yet the EU 
construction may now need also a pinch of 
modernism and Art Nouveau, of lean 
functionality and fresh creativity – as much as, 
after the Gothic era, came the Renaissance.  
Perhaps Europe’s main point of architectural 
reference should be the Sagrada Familia, and not 
only for the uniqueness of its style: after all, it is 
still under construction, as a quintessential work 
in progress; its original design has been adapted 
and updated over the decades; and it is 
enormously popular, with visitors relentlessly 
flocking to it from all over the world. 
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The euro zone appears to be on the edge. After a 
deceptive lull in the early months of the year, the 
financial crisis is back in force. If Greece is forced 
out of the euro, political and financial mayhem 
could cause a slump more devastating that the 
post-Lehman collapse. But even assuming (and 
hoping) that this nightmare scenario does not 
materialise, the situation is pretty grim. Excluding 
Germany, the euro zone is in recession. France is 
flat-lining (as is Britain). Spain and Italy are 
sinking into deeper recession. Greece is in its fifth 
year of slump. And euro zone unemployment is at 
record highs, with nearly one in two young people 
jobless in Spain and Greece. A whole generation 
of young people risks being thrown onto the 
scrapheap. Urgent action is clearly needed. 
The economic headwinds are formidable: fiscal 
austerity, high interest rates outside AAA-rated 
countries, credit cutting by banks, deleveraging 
households, weak private-sector investment, and 
declining exports as the global slowdown 
undermines demand. Until recently, Europe’s 
strategy has focused on the measures needed to 
boost and sustain long-term economic growth, 
while neglecting the need to support it in the 
short and medium term. That is finally beginning 
to change. 
Nobody disputes the fact that countries need to 
stabilise their public debts eventually; yet 
excessive, across-the-board austerity in a 
recession can actually destabilise the economy – 
and hence public finances – instead. Thus, while 
gradual adjustment is essential, faster and deeper 
cuts are largely self-defeating: big reductions in 
private credit and government spending will 
cause a sharper slowdown – and thus a vicious 
downward spiral. 
Similarly, structural reforms that unblock labour 
and product markets are essential for boosting 
future productivity and flexibility, and the crisis 
provides a political opportunity for bold moves 
on this front in many countries. But such 
reforms will not generate growth and jobs 
immediately – indeed, they may generate 
negative side effects. 
For example, making it easier to fire workers 
ought, in time, to make businesses more willing 
to hire them and smooth the shift of workers 
from less productive jobs to more productive 
ones that helps generate growth. At the same 
time, however, the immediate impact would be a 
shakeout of less productive workers, thus raising 
unemployment, worsening public finances (as 
workers stop paying taxes and start claiming 
benefits) and reducing spending in the economy 
(since the newly unemployed workers, and those 
who fear unemployment, will spend less). At 
best, it takes a while for the growth-enhancing 
benefits of structural reforms to come through. 
But now – at a time when spending is depressed, 
credit is squeezed and barriers to starting a new 
business are often high – businesses are generally 
unwilling or unable to make the investments 
necessary to enable reforms to bear fruit. 
Slower and smarter 
The starting point for boosting growth in 
Europe is slower and smarter fiscal 
consolidation. Governments that cannot borrow 
cheaply (or at all) from markets have no option 
but to tighten their belts. But they should do so 
gradually. Shrinking economies struggling with 
high private-sector debts that weigh down on 
spending need more time to meet their deficit 
targets, as the European Commission has 
recognised in the case of Spain. And ideally, 
budget cuts ought to focus on desirable medium-
term measures such as pension reforms while 
safeguarding growth-friendly investment in areas 
such as research, skills and infrastructure. At the 
same time, governments that can borrow at 
unprecedentedly low rates – 1.26% over 10 years 
in the case of Germany – must play their role in 
supporting demand. 
Less stringent austerity needs to be 
complemented with increased and targeted 
investment. This would both support demand and 
jobs now and enable structural reforms to boost 
future growth (and tax revenues). Already last 
year, European Commission President José 
Manuel Barroso called for a big increase in the 
1 On the edge – and off 
By Philippe Legrain*  
* Philippe Legrain is Principal Adviser and head of the Analysis Team in BEPA. 
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capital and lending capacity of the European 
Investment Bank (EIB). A doubling of its paid-in 
capital is now finally on the cards and further 
increases should be considered. EU structural 
funds could be reallocated to investments targeted 
at vulnerable economies. A rapid expansion of the 
pilot programme to issue project bonds to finance 
pan-European infrastructure investment could 
also make a difference. 
Measures to encourage companies to bring 
forward investment are also needed (for 
example, governments could provide temporary 
100% capital allowances). It is also vital to attract 
increased foreign direct investment and to boost 
investment in new businesses, by making it easier 
to start them and easier for them to attract 
venture capital. All of this is important not just 
for struggling economies like Spain but also for 
Germany, where business investment remains 
low and barriers to enterprise high: according to 
the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
rankings, it is easier to start a business in Albania 
or Sierra Leone than it is in Germany. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) has acted 
decisively to prop up European banks; now it 
needs to support the real economy, too. While 
official interest rates are only 1%, solvent 
sovereigns such as Spain pay nearly 7% to 
borrow for ten years, while creditworthy 
businesses in Italy can borrow only at punitive 
rates, if at all. So the ECB should do more to 
unblock the transmission mechanism for 
monetary policy; the European Banking 
Authority should discourage excessive 
deleveraging by insisting that banks raise specific 
capital amounts rather than hit a uniform 9% 
ratio; and measures to support credit to small 
and medium-sized businesses are needed. 
Work to do for the stronger economies, too 
Boosting exports in economies that have a current-
account deficit is also essential. Businesses need to 
become more competitive, increasing productivity 
while cutting costs. A more competitive currency 
would be welcome: just as the sterling’s collapse 
since 2008 has lifted UK exports, a weaker euro 
would help Mediterranean economies regain 
competitiveness for price-sensitive exports. A fiscal 
devaluation – slashing payroll taxes and replacing 
the revenues with a higher VAT – would also help. 
A big new push to complete the single market and 
expand international trade would stimulate trade 
more generally. 
Surplus countries, too, must do their part, which is 
in their own interest. Just as China needs to allow 
the renminbi to rise, so Germany – whose current-
account surplus exceeds China’s both as a share of 
GDP and in absolute terms – needs a higher real 
exchange rate. That means that Germans need to 
earn higher wages, commensurate with their 
increased productivity, so that they can afford 
more Greek and Spanish holidays. 
One of the age-old problems in international 
economics is that there is more pressure on 
economies with a current-account deficit to 
adjust (if foreigners will no longer lend to them) 
than on those with a current-account surplus. 
This makes adjustment asymmetrical, with a 
deflationary bias: deficit countries must contract, 
but surplus countries need not reflate. 
Fortunately, the euro zone now has a new 
Excessive Imbalance Procedure that can be used 
to put pressure on economies with dangerously 
large imbalances. It ought to be applied 
symmetrically. Just as Spain needs to take 
measures to shift the balance of its economy 
from domestic demand towards exports, the 
opposite shift is needed in Germany. In addition 
to higher German wages, a cut in VAT that 
stimulated consumption would be desirable. And 
reforms to liberalise its hidebound service sector 
are essential. 
The biggest boost to growth, however, would 
come from calming the growing panic in 
financial markets. The uncertainty about the 
future of the euro and its banking system that is 
crippling business decisions needs to be 
resolved. President Barroso has proposed steps 
towards a “banking union” that would break the 
link between weak banks and weak sovereigns. 
On the fiscal front, we need a roadmap towards 
Eurobonds – not as a means of collectivising 
existing debts, but of stabilising the future 
borrowing of prudent governments. Since 
markets think ahead, this would stabilise bond 
markets and banks right now, while giving time 
for the political process to act. 
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Growth is the current buzzword in the EU. 
Everyone has finally realised that austerity 
without growth cannot work. The growth crisis 
in many European countries, with the associated 
collapse in public revenues, is aggravating the 
public finance situation, necessitating further 
cuts and leading to an economic downward 
spiral. Without growth, Europe is finding it 
increasingly difficult to deal with the social and 
political impact of the crisis.  
But creating growth is not easy, nor is it 
necessarily clear what works: Europe tried for a 
decade with the Lisbon Strategy, with very mixed 
results. It is also doubtful whether merely cutting 
wages will work: despite fast falling real incomes, 
crisis countries such as Greece and Portugal are 
not regaining competitiveness fast enough, not 
least due to their lack of industry or services to 
exploit any improvement. The “orthodox” 
economic view that real wage cuts are the route 
to growth seems increasingly unrealistic in light 
of ever increasing uncertainty – let alone 
economic, social and political disintegration, 
which reduces the availability of capital and 
lending and dampens consumption and 
investment.  
A fast-acting large Keynesian-type public 
spending injection is very unlikely, given the dire 
situation of public finances across the EU. But 
while structural and public finance reforms are 
clearly necessary, not all are linked to growth. 
Public and social investment in areas such as 
education, innovation, health or infrastructure – 
crucial for future growth – is being hurt by 
indiscr iminate spending cuts .  Mass 
unemployment is deteriorating human capital, 
raising the risk of a “lost generation” as well as 
adding to the burden on public purses. But even 
the right reforms have a fatal flaw: they will take 
time to work – time which we do not have.  
At EU level, there are a number of policies 
which can help to encourage growth: fixing 
Europe’s banking system, completing the Single 
Market (including the Digital Single Market), 
deepening the transatlantic economic space, 
developing and deploying new financial 
instruments (such as the Connecting Europe 
Facility and the use of “EU project bonds”), 
implementing “Europe 2020” and reorienting 
the Multi-Annual Financial Framework to focus 
on growth. Moreover, public and social 
investment which promises long term returns 
5such as education expenditure which increases a 
country’s hu,an capital) should be exempted 
from severe cuts and be treated akin to private 
investment rather than unproductive public 
expenditure. But even if these policies can be 
successfully delivered they are, in essence, 
European-level structural reforms which will 
take time to work. 
There are some interventions which promise to 
work faster such as expanding European 
Investment Bank’s asset base to maintain lending 
at the levels reached during the crisis. It is also 
important that relatively loose monetary policy 
continues, entailing an acceptance of a modest 
increase in inflation. Some collateralisation of 
debt, whether in the form of Eurobonds or some 
other, might also alleviate some of the debt-
financing pressures for some countries – although 
the link to growth here is, at best, indirect.  
A tale of two growth crises 
But there is a more fundamental challenge: 
Europe is facing two growth crises at the same 
time. Not only is there a sluggish overall growth 
level, in part pre-dating the crisis; but there is 
also growth divergence, with a widening gap 
between the countries in trouble and the best-
performing ones. Most of the measures 
mentioned above will not address the growth 
divergence crisis: they do not specifically benefit 
the countries deepest in crisis while, in most 
cases, the better performing countries have 
greater capacity to exploit the opportunities 
which may arise. 
The crisis countries need a more focused growth 
pact to alleviate the current situation and provide 
investment for future growth. The focus should 
2 Growing out of  trouble  
By Fabian Zuleeg* 
*Fabian Zuleeg is Chief Economist at the European Policy Centre, Brussels. 
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be on identifying the negative consequences of 
the crisis on growth – arising for example from 
uncertainty, limited credit or high unemployment 
– and to address these as far as possible. This 
will not completely reverse the current situation 
– there is no silver bullet – but it should mitigate 
its negative impact, build a foundation for future 
growth, and provide hope and solidarity for 
citizens in the countries most affected by the 
crisis. This, in turn, would help address political 
and social challenges, for example by providing 
electorates with a positive reason to vote for 
continued reform. 
A fast-acting remedy could be the use of unspent 
structural funds for the debtor countries, which 
also have the advantage that they would not 
require further transfers from such countries as 
Germany. But, in order to be fast and effective, 
they have to be spent differently than in the past 
– and aim rather to: 
- finance basic public services (when education 
and health systems break down and when the 
state can no longer support people who need 
help, very little can be done to encourage growth); 
- enhance credit availability for viable companies 
in the crisis countries, especially SMEs, which 
can be channeled through commercial banks via 
the EIB (building on the recently-announced 
SME guarantee fund); 
- support people who have to move, for instance 
through language training and relocation advice: 
given falling labour demand in these countries, 
for many individuals it will only be possible to 
maintain their skill levels abroad – and more 
mobility can alleviate unemployment in the crisis 
countries and skill shortages in the better 
performing areas of the EU; 
- finance public service digitalisation projects, 
turning the crisis into an opportunity to enhance 
public administration efficiency; 
- provide SMEs in the crisis countries with 
support to put their business on the web and 
expand beyond the country’s borders; 
- support creativity and innovation in companies 
and the educational system by matching each 
euro spent on R&D and by investing in e-
literacy; 
- develop and target new financial instruments 
which can combine public and private 
investment, e.g. EU infrastructure bonds; 
- support infrastructure projects in the crisis 
countries: while these are unlikely to have a major 
impact on long-term growth, they could absorb 
some of the overcapacity in construction in the 
short term and thus alleviate mass unemployment. 
Critically, public money alone will not be 
enough: private investment is needed, not only 
from within the country but also from abroad. 
This will require a more radical approach: for 
example, an insurance and guarantee scheme 
providing security against the additional risk 
which arises from the possibility of a country 
exiting the euro (and the subsequent economic 
melt-down). 
No panacea, but...  
The economically stronger countries should also 
help reduce imbalances within the euro zone by 
encouraging domestic consumption and imports, 
as well as extending support schemes – e.g. for 
renewable energy – to the crisis countries. A more 
generous (temporary) transfer mechanism could 
also provide social relief in the crisis countries, 
helping to maintain a minimum level of private 
consumption. While it will not be easy to convince 
the better performing countries of the need for 
these measures, they might be a more attractive 
alternative than the proposed Eurobonds. 
None of these measures will restore growth in 
the crisis countries, at least in the short term. 
They also do not remove the need for further 
reforms and for public finance consolidation. 
Nor do they address the fundamental 
governance issue, which requires more fiscal, 
economic and political integration. But they can, 
to some degree, alleviate the current situation 
and sow the seeds for future growth. This can 
demonstrate to the citizens in the crisis countries 
that they are not left alone and can help provide 
hope for the future – hope without which 
reforms cannot be sustained. This should buy 
Europe some time in which current reforms can 
start to work and the more fundamental political 
reforms can be implemented. 
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EU Budget Negotiations: Need for a healthy 
and constructive debate 
The negotiations of the 2014-2020 EU 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) are 
starting to heat up, almost one year after the 
Commission published its first proposals and in 
view of their finalisation by the end of 2012. 
Nobody expected these negotiations to be easy. 
In fact, the first discussions at ministerial level in 
the General Affairs Council meeting of 27 March 
were probably worse than expected. To avoid 
long and acrimonious negotiations which would 
have high political costs, it seems necessary to 
move from dogmatic arguments and entrenched 
positions to a more pragmatic and constructive 
approach. Indeed, policymakers should work on 
the Commission’s proposal, to agree on a well-
spent budget which benefits all countries, and 
simultaneously on a reform of the EU financing 
system to set new EU own resources. 
http://www.notre-europe.eu/en/viewpoint/
publication/eu-budget-negotiations-need-for-a-
healthy-and-constructive-debate/  
Europe’s Misguided Search for Growth 
A few months following the signature of the “fiscal 
compact” that committed 25 Member States to 
putting tough deficits limits into their national 
constitutions, the urge to be seen to be “doing 
something” is leading Europe’s policy-makers to 
rely on the EU few instruments available to foster 
growth. But they should recognise that today’s 
growth crisis is quite different than it has been in 
the past. In the author’s view, the real bargain 
should not be austerity plus a Marshall Plan for the 
south, but rather continued austerity plus labour 
market reforms in the south, combined with more 
infrastructure investment in Germany and other 
AAA-rated countries – such as the Netherlands. 
Deep service-sector reforms in Germany would 
also help unlock the country’s productivity 
potential and open its market to services exports 
from southern Europe. 
http://www.ceps.eu/book/europe%E2%80%
99s-misguided-search-growth  
Eurobonds, Flight to Quality, and 
TARGET2 Imbalances 
This brief illustrates how the introduction of 
Eurobonds may provide an effective if still partial 
solution to some of the fundamental problems 
that have been raised during the sovereign debt 
crisis in the eurozone. In a five part analysis, it 
demonstrates how the structure of European 
banking collateral and the geographic flight to 
quality across European financial markets have 
strong negative interactions in sovereign debt 
markets. The brief also considers the advantages 
and disadvantages that Eurobonds would present 
as a potential solution to this underlying dynamic. 
It concludes by focusing on the challenges 
associated with implementation of any Eurobond 
proposal. While it makes some suggestions, the 
most important message from this analysis is that 
implementation should be the focus for debate: 
political leaders have to decide about whether to 
pursue Eurobonds in principle. 
h t t p : / / w w w . s i e p s . s e / s i t e s / d e f a u l t /
files/2012_4epa%20EN_A4.pdf  
Who Lost Greece? The geopolitical 
consequences of the Greek crisis 
This paper argues that the geopolitical dimensions 
of Greece’s (and Europe’s) economic crisis that 
have been largely ignored by analysts and decision 
makers, should not be underestimated. If Greece 
fails to recover, it may well be forced to leave the 
Eurozone and this will have a huge economic and 
political impact on the Euro and the EU. There 
will also be severe repercussions for regional 
stability in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern 
Mediterranean, as well as the EU’s and NATO’s 
ability to play a substantial role in those regions. 
Three simplified scenarios are outlined in an 
effort to predict the potential evolution of 
Greece’s foreign policy: (1) Greece leaves the 
Eurozone and the EU; (2) Greece leaves the 
Eurozone only; (3) Greece remains in the 
Eurozone and the EU. 
h t t p : / / w w w . e l i a m e p . g r / w p - c o n t e n t /
uploads/2012/02/dokos1.pdf  
3 Think Tank Twitter 
Think Tank Twitter (TTT) aims to provide regular information and updates on what is produced by think tanks and research centres across 
Europe (and beyond) on EU policy issues. As an analogy to the original Twitter, each summary – or tweet – does not exceed 140 words, rather 
than characters. Those who wish to signal new publications for possible inclusion can send them to the email address bepa-think-tank-
twitter@ec.europa.eu 
bepa monthly brief 
May 2012 – Issue 56 
8 
 
Indignados in Perspective  
This report questions whether social democracy 
is still relevant in the West in the post-industrial 
era. The rise of new social movements (e.g. the 
indignados and the Occupy movement) attempt 
to create a new alternative. De-industrialization 
in the West and the concomitant decline of trade 
unions in manufacturing, has led social 
democratic parties to jettison their traditional 
constituencies and join conservatives in 
dismantling the welfare state. This has also led to 
the greater salience of finance and speculation 
and has vastly increased inequalities in income 
and wealth. The new social movements claim 
that the policies of the diverse groups in the 
political elite do not differ: conservative and 
social democratic parties in the West pursue the 
same policies of fiscal discipline and austerity, 
with the burden of mistakes of the rich falling on 
the poor. 
h t t p : / / w w w . c i d o b . o r g / e n / p u b l i c a t i o n s /
n o t e s _ i n t e r n a c i o n a l s / n 1 _ 5 3 /
indignados_in_perspective_is_social_democracy_irrelevan
t_in_a_post_industrial_era_in_the_west  
 
After the China-EU Summit: Reaffirming a 
comprehensive strategic partnership 
This paper focuses on the EU-China strategic 
partnership after the 2012 summit. It argues that 
following a low point in 2008, the latest China-
EU summit has injected new confidence and 
momentum in their strategic partnership. Some 
progress on such issues as trade, investment, 
cultural and academic exchanges resulted from 
dialogue and consultation between parties. Yet, 
the EU-China partnership falls short of realising 
its potential due to the reluctance of parties to 
make reciprocal concessions and bridge their 
differences. China and the EU take divergent 
approaches to their partnership, which are not 
incompatible but demand more mutual 
understanding: China follows a top-down 
approach, whereas the EU prefers a bottom-up 
one. The relationship is in great need of a real 
and substantive meeting of minds. 
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/12/sec-
gov/PB3_China_EU_Summit.pdf  
 
 
Lost in Transition: The world according to 
Egypt’s SCAF 
This report discusses the performance of the 
SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) 
since taking power in 2011 post-Mubarak. This 
move aimed to: preserve as much as possible 
from the previous system; restore normalcy; 
marginalise a protest movement it viewed with 
considerable suspicion; and both work with and 
contain the Islamists. It did not wish to remain in 
the spotlight and be blamed for what would go 
wrong. But it also did not intend to be sidelined, 
lose its self-ascribed role as guarantor of the 
country’s safety and interests. The authors view 
the latest presidential elections as an opportunity 
for the SCAF to consult broadly and seriously 
with all political representatives and reach 
agreement on the powers of the presidency, the 
constitutional committee’s make-up and the basis 
of civil-military relations. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/
Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%
20Africa/Egypt/121-lost-in-transition-the-world-
a c c o r d i n g - t o - e g y p t s - s c a f . p d f ?
utm_source=egyptemail&utm_medium=pdf&utm_cam
paign=mremail  
Reversing the Vicious Circle in North 
Africa’s Political Economy 
This report analyses the policy failures behind the 
process of marginalization and exclusion that was 
at the origin of the popular uprisings at the 
beginning of 2011, with a view to discussing 
alternative policy responses and assessing the 
prospects for seriously rethinking previous 
economic policies. Despite the differences among 
North African countries, in the last decade, 
relatively good macroeconomic performances were 
accompanied by growing inequalities, worsening 
poverty levels, and deteriorating labour market 
conditions. These challenges are investigated from 
the perspective of three different – but interrelated 
– groups: the rural population, urban population, 
and youth. To overcome these difficulties, the 
authors recommend rethinking agricultural policies 
through the new concept of food sovereignty; 
redefining urban policies by developing new forms 
of participatory democracy; and promoting 
decentralization and youth economic inclusion. 
h t t p : / / w w w . g m f u s . o r g / w p - c o n t e n t /
files_mf/1336582148PacielloEtAl_ViciousCircle_Apr1
2_web.pdf 
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Evénements  
En coopération avec l’unité de planification 
politique du Secrétariat Général de l’OTAN, le 
BEPA a organisé le 7 mai un déjeuner autour du 
thème “L’Union européenne, l’OTAN et la 
montée en puissance de l’Asie”, auquel des 
représentants de la Commission européenne, du 
Service européen pour l’action extérieure et de 
l’OTAN ont participé et échangé leurs vues sur 
ce sujet.  
A l’occasion de la journée de l’Europe le 9 mai, 
de nombreux conseillers ont participé à des 
activités pour célébrer cette journée, notamment 
à Athènes, Rio de Janeiro et Washington.  
Le 3 mai, le chef adjoint du BEPA, Margaritis 
Schinas, a participé à la présentation du projet 
ESPAS (European Strategy and Policy Analysis 
System) à Paris, lors de la célébration du 
10ème anniversaire de l’Institut d’études de 
sécurité de l’UE (EUISS). Le 15 mai, la Task 
Force du projet ESPAS s’est réunie à Bruxelles 
en vue de faire le point sur la progression du 
projet et d’avancer sur plusieurs dossiers d’ordre 
administratif, financier et concernant le site 
Internet dédié au projet ESPAS.  
Les 15 et 16 mai, le Groupe Européen d’Ethique 
a tenu sa 14ème réunion à Bruxelles. Le Groupe a 
accueilli des présentations centrées sur le thème 
de la gouvernance de l’énergie dans l’UE de la 
part de: Prof. Henk Zandvoort (Delft University 
of Technology), Dr. Richard Adams (Comité 
Economique et Social Européen), Prof. William 
D’Haeseleer (Université de Leuven, Energy 
Institute) et Prof. Mariano Marzo (Université de 
Barcelone). 
Le 21 mai, le BEPA a tenu conjointement avec le 
bureau moscovite de Carnegie Endowment un 
séminaire consacré aux relations entre l’UE et la 
Russie. Cet événement a réuni plusieurs 
membres du BEPA, des représentants du SEAE, 
de l’OTAN, le Prof. Dusan Sidjanski – conseiller 
spécial du Président Barroso – ainsi qu’une 
douzaine d’experts russes. Les débats ont porté 
sur les conséquences possibles de l’élection de 
Vladimir Poutine à la présidence sur la situation 
en Russie. Spécifiquement, le débat a porté sur 
l’impact des élections récentes sur les réformes 
économiques, la politique de voisinage entre 
l’UE et la Russie, l’unité économique eurasienne, 
des questions relatives à l’énergie, à la sécurité et 
aux échanges commerciaux, avec une attention 
particulière portée sur l’accession récente de la 
Russie à l’OMC.  
Activités à venir  
Le 6 juin, la conseillère scientifique en chef du 
Président, Anne Glover, accueillera des 
représentants du domaine des sciences et 
technologies pour un échange de vues avec le 
Président de la Commission, José Manuel 
Barroso. 
Le 7 juin, le BEPA recevra dans les locaux de la 
Commission 40 jeunes leaders européens dans le 
cadre du projet “40 under 40”, en lien avec 
Europanova et Les amis de l’Europe. Au cours 
de cet événement, les jeunes leaders auront 
l’occasion de discuter avec le président du 
Conseil de l’Union européenne Herman van 
Rompuy. De plus, Philippe Legrain, conseiller 
principal et chef de l’équipe Analyse du BEPA 
participera à la session sur l’avenir économique 
de l’Europe et Anne Glover, la conseillère 
scientifique en chef du Président discutera avec 
les jeunes leaders de la manière dont l’UE doit 
agir pour rester en tête au sein de la compétition 
mondiale.  
Du 18 au 20 juin aura lieu à Copenhague, sous la 
présidence danoise du Conseil de l’Union 
européenne la réunion du Groupe européen 
d’éthique et la table ronde internationale sur la 
bioéthique. 
Le 21 juin, le directeur général du BEPA Jean-
Claude Thébault présentera le projet ESPAS au 
Centre d’étude et de réflexion prospective 
Futuribles à Paris.  
Le 27 juin le BEPA co-organisera avec l’OTAN 
un déjeuner sur le thème des Balkans 
occidentaux. Des représentants de la 
Commission, du Service européen pour l’action 
extérieure et de l’OTAN auront ainsi 
l’opportunité de se rencontrer, faire l’état des 
lieux du processus d’élargissement et échanger 
leurs vues sur l’avenir de la région.  
4 BEPA News 
